ICEBERG 1 - a recap and a view from India

Of all the piracy cases off Somalia currently unresolved and going from bad to worse, none makes for sadder reading than the one involving the ICEBERG 1. Here is a file photograph of the ship along with the original first report on its hijacking in March 2010:-

http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/03/panama-flagged-vessel-hijacked-close-to-aden/

But if you want to go into it chronologically, then the following questions need to be addressed and answered . . .

# What were the Indian Government documents that the Indian nationals onboard were sailing on, CDC, CoC? And if so, what were the departure Indian airport/seaport formalities like, are there any records with DGS?

# Who was the agent in India, were they linked to the "training" establishments, or what?

# What is the relationship between the owners and the cargo interests?

# Most of all, what happens to de-briefing of returned seafarers in the RAK AFRIKANA case, and is it in any way linked to the ICEBERG-1?

Questions, questions - and the bankers in question suspected of being the real backers - they appear to be the same.

The case of the disturbing personal eMail - NORFOLK EXPRESS grounding

The Chief Officer of the NORFOLK EXPRESS received a personal eMail while on watch which troubled him so much that he lost all semblance of attentiveness, resulting in the ship going aground at full speed in the Gulf of Suez, because he was totally distracted.

Read more about it here:-

http://maritimeaccident.org/2009/10/norfolk-worries-led-to-grounding/

The lookout has been sent elsewhere for other tasks.

To quote from the article:-

A number of lessons arise from the incident, the most obvious relates to lookouts. Many of us prefer to be alone when dealing with personal issues and its tempting to send the lookout away so we can be alone with our thoughts. Unfortunately, those are the very conditions under which we need to have a lookout present in case we get so deep in our own concerns we lose track of what’s going on.
Whatever the psychological state of the officer of the watch a lookout might have made the difference.
At the same time, two alarms were not functioning, the bridge watch alarm which should have sounded every 12 minutes, and the echo sounder depth alarm. BSU says that it is uncertain that these would have alerted the chief officer to the situation.
Two GPS waypoint alarms sounded but were not responded to.