The centre of Maritime Piracy - London?

And why doesn't this surprise me or others?

(From the Times)

The piracy racket begins here in the City

Matthew Parris

January 7 2012 12:01AM

Maritime insurance companies have it nicely sewn up – and they are encouraging the lawlessness to continue

Is the insurance industry a hidden cause of the growth of Somali piracy? This week’s report from the Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs prompts, but does not ask, the question. It skirts around it.

The committee’s recommendations are workmanlike but cautious in the extreme: a legal regime for the carriage and use of weapons for the purpose of deterring piracy (fair enough: uncertainty over the status in law of armed guards does need to be resolved). And better international co-operation to create a co-ordinated anti-piracy strategy. We all want that.

Yet no properly armed merchant ship has ever been successfully hijacked off Somalia. Think about it: how easy is it to board, from below, a great high-sided vessel at sea? So you would expect at least a recommendation that British insurers require the presence on board of an adequate force of armed guards rather than simply offer a discounted premium — motorists, for instance, cannot insure against car theft without a car alarm.

There is no such recommendation. The industry was not too keen on this idea. Think about that too. The greater part of maritime insurance is British, but very few British merchant seamen will ever be affected. You may speculate that the risk of the occasional loss of a few Filipino crewmen is preferred to a substantial hike in the cost of every voyage and the danger that maritime insurance would be driven away from the City of London.

In its conclusions the committee comments: “We are surprised by the continuing lack of information about those funding and profiting from piracy.”

They should not be surprised. Piracy is funded by pirates and insurance companies. A whole network of agents and middlemen has sprung up and is used by insurers and shippers as a semi-formalised line of communication with the Somali pirates. Many careers and many fortunes — all perfectly legal — are now founded upon this racket.

Efforts to combat the evil are failing. Despite this week’s US Navy rescue of 13 Iranian sailors, naval engagements against pirates have not succeeded and there is no evidence that our own military gives this serious priority. After nine international resolutions and three multilateral naval drives against piracy in the Indian Ocean, the average ransom has risen since 2007 from $600,000 per vessel to $4.7 million now; $135 million was paid in ransoms in 2011, as compared with $5 million in 2007. One might expect a growing sense of alarm within the shipping industry and among those who insure it. Instead, one encounters a preference for letting well alone.

In evidence to the committee, Stephen Askins, a maritime insurance lawyer, agreed that negotiation (by which he must also mean the payment of ransom) is preferred over military intervention, and “in a commercial sense, we would rather there was minimum government involvement in the negotiation process. [We] ... have a process and, on a commercial level, it works.”

In short, the insurance industry is collecting the money from world shipping, facilitating negotiations with the thieves and helping organise the payments to them. It’s all nicely sewn up. The select committee discovered that “insurance premiums have more than doubled as Lloyd’s widened the risk area to most of the Indian Ocean. However, Somali piracy has also constituted a business opportunity for some new and existing British companies, a number of which are involved in insurance.”

What interest does the industry have in messy dogfights at sea? Much to be preferred is a set of orderly arrangements for the payment of ransoms, which insurers then collect from their shipping clients in the form of increased premiums. They act as middlemen, effectively (however unwillingly) working for the pirates as well as their policyholders; and creaming off their cut from the transaction. Look at it, if you like, as a boon to the City combined with a freelance form of foreign aid. Thus has the situation evolved, to nobody’s great detriment but the ultimate customer: you and me, and the occasional poor Filipino who gets caught in the crossfire.

The logical conclusion of this evolution would be for the insurance and shipping industries to strike a deal with a consortium of the pirates for protection for certified vessels. This would save the pirates the trouble of putting to sea, save loss of life and save shipowners the distress of interruptions to their shipping.

In evidence to the select committee, representatives of the maritime insurance industry insisted that they were not profiting from piracy premiums because the cost of payouts was racing ahead of their ability to raise their premiums. If (while raising an eyebrow) we are to take them at their word, then we must accept that insurers are offering piracy cover as a hook or loss-leader to bring in more business and (as they put it to the committee) cement long-term client relationships. So losses on piracy are being recouped by raising premiums for the whole shipping industry, even clients not affected by piracy. Somali crooks have effectively instituted a levy on the totality of world shipping.

Insurers put it like this to the committee: “We would much rather [ransoms] were not being paid, but the reality of the situation is that there is no other way to secure the release of crews ... We therefore have to go past the moral consequences, engage with the pirates and pay them a ransom.”

And I think that’s true for insurers. But should we accept this insurance arrangement?

In Britain we do not criminalise individuals who cave in to blackmail (unless the demands come from a terrorist organisation). We do, though, outlaw the paying of bribes as well as the demanding of them. A British company doing business in Nigeria could not insure against having to make corrupt payments. A pirate, an insurer and shipowner, however (or their agents), can coolly negotiate a ransom payment confident that only the pirate is breaking the law, while those within reach of the law are not breaking it.

Here, then, is my own report, concluded by a very select committee of two: my researcher and I. English law could easily be tweaked to criminalise the payment of ransoms. There’s a range of ways you could do this: (1) amend the laws on proceeds of crime to make clear that a ransom can be “proceeds of crime” before it is handed over; (2) declare in statute that paying a ransom is tantamount to helping to fund the next kidnapping, and therefore already unlawful; (3) deem Somali pirates a terrorist-linked network; or (4) simply criminalise the payment of ransoms.

But there’s one huge problem about any legal change that might put a ransom-payer in the dock: public opinion in sensational and heartbreaking cases. So I propose that this be the long stop, held out as a threat to the industries should their co-operation in a more limited proposal not be forthcoming. This proposal is to require all British insurance against piracy in the Indian Ocean to be contingent upon the carriage on board of an adequate private security squad. The industry will squeal. But the policies they now offer and pay out on are an inducement to piracy. The committee should have said so.

+++

Why are Indian ports the destination for every over-age rustbucket in the world?

As published at MoneyLife:-

http://moneylife.in/article/why-are-overage-ships-with-improper-documents-being-chartered-for-indian-ports/18732.html

Why are overage ships with improper documents being chartered for Indian ports?
August 08, 2011 06:25 PM | 
Veeresh Malik

New questions are cropping up everyday over the Rak Carrier and Pavit, but nobody is giving any answers; and all this is happening in the region of India’s biggest naval base

As the issue of oil from the tanks of the MV Rak Carrier and the MT Pavit start reaching the coastline and bays, as well as estuaries around Mumbai, the issues of the documentation around the two ships starts getting even murkier, as does what appears to be a combined effort to cover-up. The fact remains, however, that unlike in the case of the similarily overage MSC Chitra, where a specific collision caused very specific damage to the ship before it went down more or less intact by way of oil tanks and other spaces, in the case of the Rak Carrier a progressive breakup is going to create havoc, and in the case of the Pavit the complete mystery of how a ship that was allegedly sinking landed up off Mumbai with oil drums lashed and intact on deck is going to need more forensic capabilities than shown so far.

As seafarers all over the world know, the first thing that goes adrift and overboard, breaking loose from any restraint whatsover, are the lubricating and hydraulic oil drums stored on deck, simply because they are the most exposed items on deck. In the case of the Pavit, despite everything reported, the sight of oil drums merrily standing neatly made fast on deck is in itself as miraculous as, for example, the fact that the ship itself did not sink after being abandoned.

However, it is what appears to be a multiple cover-up in the case of the Rak Carrier that nurtures astonishment of a degree which is doing more than lifting eyebrows all over. This is over and above what appears to be a fairly well planned evacuation from the ship, to use a polite word, leaving it to sink at a location where it will cause yet some more hazards to marine life as well as other passing traffic. All this in the biggest naval base in India.

Consider this:

# The chief officer of the Rak Carrier, in an interview on TimesNow television, claimed that the ship had arrived in Mumbai as early as 12th July, and then took stores as well as fuel while anchored off Mumbai. How she managed this in the monsoons in the first case and without customs or immigration formalities in the other, is something that needs to be responded to. So far, there's been deep silence. Immigration comes under the Intelligence Bureau, so it is not possible to get this information under the Right to Information Act and as for customs it is absolutely likely that the ship simply did not inform the Indian Customs.

# There is still no response from anybody—neither the owners, nor charterers, or cargo interests, or the Directorate General of Shipping, or whoever-on what class this ship carries and who was responsible for declaring in the statement from the Press Information Breau that she was under Lloyd's Register, when Lloyd's themselves have published that they withdrew class in November 2010. How a ship was chartered in with cargo for India when she was not only very overage, but also without class is not being explained. Again, deep silence.

# The Maharashtra police have, as per reports, filed for "negligence" under the Indian Penal Code. This is about as easy as it gets, though prima facie, this epsiode smacks of criminal conspiracy, fraud and attempt to destroy evidence. There is no information on whether the ship's staff brought the hard discs of the various logs and data recorders on board, though they seem to have had time to get their packed bags, computers, personal documents and more.

# From the environmental point of view, it is amply clear that this is much more than just a state government issue. The impact of this specific pollution is going to be what it is, but it will embolden others to come and do what they want within India's economic zone, whether it is fishing or dumping oil and other pollutants. In addition, there is a national security angle, which again goes beyond the singular purview of the state. When are the central investigative agencies going to step in?

# A gazette notification was published on 29 December 2005 instructing all parties that ships bringing cargoes into India are to adhere to certain simple logical compliances as far as insurance and other related issues like pollution and wreck removal are concerned. This gazette notification was kept in abeyance soon thereafter, without any explanation why, on 2 August 2006. Here is the notice.

The text of the Gazette of India notification no. 403 dated 20 September 2005 is reproduced hereunder.

" G.S.R. 600(E) - In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 6 of the Indian Ports Act, 1908 (15 of 1908), the Central Government hereby makes the following rules to regulate the entry of vessels into Ports, namely:
1. (1) These rules may be called the Entry of Vessels into Ports Rules, 2005.
(2) They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.

2.   Insurance cover:
Owner of a vessel entering a Port shall have to produce an insurance cover for compensation in relation to:
(i) Wreck removal expenses;
(ii) Pollution damage caused by spillage of oil or any hazardous and noxious substances; from a Protection and Indemnity Club which is a member of an International Group of Protection and Indemnity Club or a Club duly approved by the Central Government.

3. The vessel which fails to produce the insurance cover referred to in rule 2 shall not be allowed to enter the Port:
Provided that the provisions of these rules shall not be applicable to a non Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention vessel if the owner of the vessel furnishes an undertaking for compensation to the port in connection with expenses which port may incur on removal of wreck and pollution damages caused.

4.  Explanation: 
Non Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS) ships means a cargo ship with less than 500 gross tonnage (GT) and includes a ship engaged on domestic voyage, a domestic passenger ship and other small ship being used as fishing vessel and tug."

However, on 2 August 2006, the same ministry deemed it fit to issue another gazette notification: -

"The entry of vessels into Port Rules 2005 published in the extraordinary gazette dated September 20, 2005, vide No. G.S.R. 600(E) under Section 6 of the Indian Ports Act 1908 (15 of 1908) is kept in abeyance with immediate effect until further order of the Central Government of India".

That gives all of us an idea of the real direction that the central government is taking in context with the issue of insurance, or lack of insurance thereof, for ships visiting Indian ports.

Another circular/notification from the Directorate General of Shipping on the subject of overage ships, especially during the monsoons, is reproduced in its entirety, and nothing more need be said about the subject. It is another fact and truth that overage ships of all sorts regularly visit Indian ports, for what is known as "commercial considerations", of all sorts.
 
Shipping Development Circular No.1 of 2008

NO: SD-9/CHRT(82)/97-IV          Dated  25.04.2008                                                                               
Subject :  Revised guidelines for chartering of vessels under Sections 406 and 407 of Merchant Shipping Act ,1958.

Concerned by the rising trend of marine accidents in and around Indian waters especially during rough weather, the Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport & Highways set up a Committee in July, 2007 to suggest urgent measures to reduce marine casualties.  Since analysis of the accidents over the last 3 years showed a significant correlation between age of vessels and the break-downs which caused these casualties, the Committee recommended, inter-alia, the revision of guidelines to restrict the age of vessels plying in Indian waters and a tighter regime of surveys and inspections.

2. Accordingly, in the interest of maritime safety, it has been decided to modify existing guidelines for chartering of vessels under Sections 406 and 407 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 (M S Act).  Existing  DGS Circulars Nos. 7 of 2003 dated 11.06.03 and 8 of 2003 dated 14.08.2003 (read with clarifications vide Memorandum dated 21.11.2003 and 31.12.2003), restrict only the charters of tankers to those which are less than 25 years (30 years in the case of gas carriers) and are CAS and CAP-2 rated and classed with IACS.

3. It is now further decided, after taking into consideration the views and objections of a wide range of stakeholders, that, with effect from 15th May 2008, applications for permissions for chartering in / grant of licence to vessels under Sections 406 and 407 of the MS Act either for single or specific voyages or time charters that enable vessels to visit an Indian port or to ply in Indian territorial waters or the Indian EEZ will be entertained only as follows:

3.1 During the period of foul weather, being 1st June till 31st August in the Arabian Sea along the West Coast and 1st May till 30th November in the Bay of Bengal along the East Coast of the Indian Peninsula:

3.1.1 From all cargo vessels - other than gas carriers, oil or product tanker and   dredgers - only if they are less than 25 years of age. 

3.1.2 From gas carriers, only if they are less than 30 years of age.

3.1.3 From oil or product tankers, only if they are double hull or if single hull, less than 20 yrs and fulfilling the Condition Assessment Scheme (CAS) requirements as assessed by the Indian Register of Shipping (IRS) or Classification Societies that are notified as Recognized Organizations by the Government.   Consequently, SD Circulars 7 and 8 of 2003 giving guidelines for chartering of oil and product tankers will stand modified accordingly for the period of foul weather.

3.1.4 For all time charters of vessels other than passenger vessels, to be entered into with effect from 15th May, 2008, which include in the period of charter any period of foul weather, only if the age of the vessel proposed is less than 25 years at the time of termination of the charter period.

3.2 Regardless of the period of the year - from Offshore Service Vessels (OSVs) of all description (e.g. anchor handling tug, accommodation barge, tug, supply vessels, support vessels, barges, pontoons, etc.) or any other type of vessels which are chartered-in / engaged for the purposes of  plying in and around offshore oil exploration areas and / or where security/safety sensitivities are high, only from those that are less than 25 years old, are classed with the Indian Register of Shipping (IRS); and    have undergone inspection and rectification of deficiencies of hull, machinery, safety appliances and operational requirements (e.g. manning, etc.) before entry into Indian territorial waters.

4. All shipping companies, exporters, importers and agents may kindly take note of the change in eligibility of vessels for consideration of grant of chartering permissions and amend their own chartering terms, practices and instructions accordingly.

5. This issues with the approval of the Director General of Shipping and Ex-Officio Additional Secretary to the Govt. of India.

Sd/-
(Samuel Darse)
Deputy Director General of Shipping

MEMORANDUM

NO: SD-9/CHRT(82)/97-IV    Dated 13.05.2008

Subject : S.D. Circular No.01 of 2008 - Clarifications regarding

This Directorate has been receiving numerous correspondences seeking clarifications on Shipping Development Circular No. 01 of 2008 dated 25.04.2008 issued by this Directorate regarding revised guidelines for chartering in  of vessels under Section 406 and 407 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. The matter has been examined further and it is clarified as follows:-

1. The said Circular does not apply to Indian Flag Vessels, as they are registered and already licensed to ply in Indian waters.

2. The said Circular applies to all vessels chartered in under Section 406 and 407 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 except vessels already carrying the Indian Flag.

3. The said Circular is applicable from 15th May 2008. It therefore does not affect vessels licensed under section 406 and 407 before 15th May 2008, even, if the existing license overlaps the rough weather period. 

4. Clause 3.1.4 of the said Circular stands amended to read as follows:
 "3.1.4. For time charters of vessels other than passenger vessels, to be entered into with effect from 15th May 2008, which include in the period of charter any period of foul weather, only if the age of the vessel proposed, is less than that specified in Clause 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 for the respective category of vessel, at the time of termination of the charter period".

5. This issues with the approval of the Director General of Shipping and Ex-Officio Additional Secretary to the Government of India.

Sd/-
(Samuel Darse)
Deputy Director General of Shipping

Moneylife shall file the required RTI applications in these cases.

FOC ships, piracy, dear DGS, who or where is the real shipowner?

Very often, in cases involving Indian seafarers working on foreign flag ships, through RPS companies operating under DG Shipping auspices, the big question arises:- WHO is the real ship-owner? Leave alone fraud issues like fake class, absent P&I cover, lack of insurance, sub-standard rust buckets. The big question is nobody can answer - who is the real ship-owner?

The RPS company, more often than not like in the DGCA scams, are in some way or the other related or otherwise 'friendly" to people at DGS. Same old boy network, yeah, sure. Worked wonders for all of us.

But now our old boys are getting tortured, kidnapped, imprisoned and injured, maimed, even killed. Gone too far. Time to look around and put an end to this, time to fix the rot at DGS before a scam of the DGCA sort hits the ceiling, and media.

One set of simple solutions coming from a few people I spoke with, which is another thing - here in Delhi, the fear of DGS is so all-pervasive, that everybody wants to keep their identity hidden. But OK, so this is it, especially where the real owner can not be traced, and all sorts of other entities come in front:-

1) Indian flag ship wners are covered under MSA and can easily be held  traced and liable under Indian Law.

 

 

2) Issue arises in the case of foreign flag ships which are FOC and through RPS agencies where actual ownership is not known since front company is hidden in tax havens. This is absolutely illegal under Indian laws, for Indian entities to do business with entities who are hiding behind tax havens, and DGS complicity in this needs to be investigated. How is it that our own DGS extends some sort of recognition to companies which are often nothing more than suitcases and laptops hidden in secret offices in tax havens, have they not heard of people going to jail lately, for all this? Better ask around, Shri DG and NA, and soon.

 

 

3) But interim, for immediate relief, we need to demand for Indian seafarers working on foreign flag ships through RPS companies that DGS simply ceases some of these illegal practices and just complies with Indian laws to the maximum effect so that:-

 

 

a) All bank guarantees with RPS companies be increased to Rs 50 lakhs per seafarer instead of present Rs 10000.oo per seafarer. Alternately, a policy for value of Rs 50 lakhs per seafarer be made and deposited with DGS for the next of kin. This number is basis the amount of minimum insurance and under-writing for a junior Government functionary going to Afghanistan on deputation, by the way. Add to that pension and the rest of it.

 

 

b) #Where flag of vessel is same as nationality of owner of vessel, then full KYC guidelines as set down by Ministry of Finance be complied with, before permitting Indian seafarers onboard.

 

 

     #Where flag of vessel is different from nationality of owner of vessel, then full KYC guidelines as down by Ministry of Finance be complied with for both entities, before permitting Indian seafarers onboard.

 

 

c) A separate kidnap and ransom cover to be taken for each Indian seafarer to the value of USD .5 million SDRs for usage towards ransom payments.

 

 

d) A separate death and disability insurance cover to be taken for each indian seafarer to the value of full payments til the age of 65 or 10 years, whicher is longer, in case of death or disability due to piracy/kidnap.

 

 

+++

 

Let us face it, DGS is not in a position to reconfirm the genuine-ness of P&I cover or documents of ships calling Indian ports, so trying to do so for ships trading exclusively abroad will be even tougher. Keep the added insurance in India, through Public Sector Insurance companies or GIC, all of us seafarers know that we are living and working in a dangerous profession with our eyes open - but please organise some protection for our families if we get kidnapped or fall afoul of pirates?

Indian seafarers, Somali piracy - and what do we want the Government to do?

Distress call: Use multiple channels to free seafarers hostage to pirates

What can be done to help the seafarers, especially Indian seafarers?

The Indian Navy is doing a great job to provide protection for Indian vessels sailing in hostile waters. But there is much that other agencies, like intelligence agencies and shipping authorities must do deal with the scourge of piracy that is brutalising Indian seamen

Read on:-

http://moneylife.in/article/distress-call-use-multiple-channels-to-free-seafarers-hostage-to-pirates/15987.html

Hijacked ship with captured crew attacks Spanish naval warship . . .

Good heavens! So now, first you get pirated or hijacked, then you get forced to use your ship to try and ram into a naval ship, which then fires back at you.


http://www.eaglespeak.us/2010/11/somali-pirates-using-big-mother-ship-to.html



The Izumi, a Japanese cargo ship captured in October 2010, was used to try and ram into the Spanish warship Infanta Cristina, which was escorting a merchant ship in the area, off the East Coast of Somalia on the 14/15 of November 2010.

Read the full report . . . amazing.

Really, is your Merchant Ship insured against piracy? How do you know?

So, dear Seafarer. Shipowner, Shipmanager, regulatory Authority, Fleet Personnel Manager, Union Leader, family members and everybody else interested in this subject of seafarers going off to dangerous waters . . .  would you please like to come out with cogent statements involving not just pleasantly couched words, but hard facts and numbers,  what really the insurance protection for the man on the ship is in case of piracy or hijack? Modern day piracy, of which just about 40% takes place in the Arabian Sea waters, is now a global phenomenon. Somalia gets a lot more attention because it appears to have become a hub lately, and is closer to India, but the rest of the world is not far behind, and the "business" of hijacking ships seems to be growing. Just like other streams of crime, for example prostitution, narcotics, arms trade - this too now seems to be settling into a pattern and a system.

That's as far as the relevance to the fact that this is now another business, and all business is about numbers, so what are the numbers, and where do the numbers go? What does it mean when somebody tells somebody else that "insurance for piracy" exists on such-and-such ship?

To start with, the piracy numbers include:-

# Investment versus returns, and a whole flotilla of numbers and words persons, and also some mercenaries, to keep the whole business well-greased. Imagine, can a transaction of almost 10 million dollars (9.8 million was the reported figure) plus costs involved in enabling this payment for releasing the supertanker SAMHO DREAM (say, another 5 million dollars) have been able to move across the globe without the direct participation of a whole lot of number crunchers  and shysters all over the world, especially in the "developed' world? So, modern-day piracy is not about to simply go away, for any reason.(Source - bankers unwilling to be identified in Europe and UAE.)

#The definitions of piracy and hijacking also appear to vary worldwide, and this in turn impacts the question of whether a vessel is a total loss or not, after the incident, whether hijack or piracy. Either way, in some countries, the insured shipowner/operator has not been "ir-retrievably deprived" of the vessel, so insurance claims for piracy or hijack, even interim, can not be paid out. Never mind what happens on the ship. In addition, it is the duty of the shipowner and his Master/crew to prove that they made all attempts to mitigate losses, and whether this includes the ransom payment or not is an open issue. So, a Master and his crew, who have not been paid, not received decent food, have been under capture, whose families may be starving - they still have to prove that all attempts were made to "mitigate" losses.

# In the UAE, it is even more complex, since they demand a "special provision" for piracy. The difference between "war risk" and "piracy" is there, not sublime, but complicated. However, one can not substitute the other, so a special cover in advance will be needed. At what point does piracy become an "act of war", given the current pronouncements of the attackers, claiming that they are working for their countries? No clear answers here, either - and carrying armed guards on board through somebody else's territorial waters, does that impact right of innocent passage? What does the Master of a ship have to say, if armed guards are on his ship, and the ship is then considered "hostile" - where do the crew stand as far as insurance goes, then?

# So while "piracy insurance" may have been taken by a shipowner/operator, please remember that "even though piracy is an insured peril, the onus to prove the act of piracy for successful recovery remains with the assured, in particular to establish that the act occurred was piracy and not terrorism, i.e. that the persons committing the act did so exclusively for their own material benefit, rather than pursuing a political, ideological or religious scope."

(Fichte & Co. http://www.fichtelegal.com/en/news_article.php?news_id=71)

Many of the latest episodes of piracy are defining their activities stikingly close to this.

# There is an estimate, provided by the Professional  General Insurance Research Organisation (GIRO) that each piracy attack on a merchant ship costs around 9 million dollars, and from another un-named source, that it is eventually between 10 and 15 million dollars, ransom and all costs. This is just a ballpark estimate, and rising lately. Working backwards from here, the average cost per merchant ship transiting the Suez Canal and going through the Gulf of Aden works out to between 70 and 110 thousand dollars, another rough estimate, and rising. Higher on ships carrying higher value cargoes, ofcourse, so assume a 10000 teu ship is paying about 300,000 dollars per trip each way - that's 30 dollars per teu extra costs. But what are the owners, cargo interests and seafarers getting out of this, incase of attack? That's not very clear.

# The number of seafarers kidnapped in piracy/hijack incidents as per the London-based International Chamber of Commerce’s Commercial Crimes Services was 867 in 2009, and 790 so far this year. There are some 'carry-forwards' who have been kidnapped in the previous year/years, and some simply 'missing'. However, this does not in any way provide any information on the disruption to seafarers even way outside in the Arabian Sea, in terms of mental tension and actual attacks.

# Allianz Global Corporate & Strategy, a leading insurer of ships and cargo, says that in most cases, piracy is covered under "normal" hull and insurance cover, even for ships not trading in piracy prone areas. The efficacy of this "normal" cover when a piracy or hijack takes place is very much under debate and till then, may well be slightly ineffective at best. So the solution would be to take additional cover. However, truth is that many owners or operators or charterers simply do not take additional cover when going through these areas - because special piracy covers are not easily available that offer special, flexible and tailor made cover for such ships.

# Here is a map of the piracy prone areas worldwide:-

http://www.aida.org.uk/AIDAEurop/AIDAStellaspaper.pdf

It is clear that marine insurance is the oldest form of insurance worldwide. War risk and piracy insurance have been linked for a long time. However, war risk insurance, and also piracy, can be unilaterally cancelled by the insurer at 48 hours notice. What does the seafarer onboard know about this, is the regulator able to provide any form of guarantees here?

It is in your interest as a seafarer to actively seek out the full details of the insurance cover taken for piracy, and to see that it is kept valid throughout your tenure - which obviously you can not do. But certainly the regulators, DG Shipping, can frame some rules urgently in this context?

Or, as is often the case, keep sailing "Ram Bharose".